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As the Chinese government has set out to harness the growing strength of the Chinese technology sector to bolster its military, policymakers in the United States have reacted with mounting alarm. Chinese President Xi Jinping formalized the concept of civil-military fusion as part of the extensive military reforms laid out in his 2016 five-year plan. officials have described Beijing’s civil-military fusion effort as a “malign agenda” that represents a “global security threat.” And as China’s defense capabilities have grown, some Western policymakers have started to wonder whether the United States needs to adopt its own version of civil-military fusion, embracing a top-down approach to developing cutting-edge technologies with military applications. He established a new Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, with himself as its head. The commission’s goal is to promote the development of dual-use technology and integrate existing civilian technologies into the arsenal of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
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The United States and its allies should take seriously Beijing’s efforts to militarize China’s technological base. Yet they should also recognize the strategy’s limitations, to avoid overreacting in ways that would prove counterproductive. China’s bureaucratic and authoritarian approach to civil-military fusion is likely to waste considerable time and money. Washington does need a strategy to strengthen its national security technology and industrial base, but it should be one that is centered on collaborative disruption that generates the right incentives for innovators, scientists, engineers, venture capitalists, and others.
By trying to control innovation, Beijing is more likely to delay and even stifle it. advantages in research and technology—advantages that are increasingly at risk not because of China but because of a lack of agility and creativity among U. Four types of Chinese entities participate in civil-military fusion. The United States will fare no better if it tries to mimic China’s model of civil-military fusion. There are traditional Chinese state-owned defense contractors and their many subsidiaries (some of which also sell into the commercial market); private dual-use manufacturers contributing research and development (R & D) and producing subcomponents for the main defense contractors and for the PLA directly; 43 PLA-supervised universities and at least a dozen state-run think tanks conducting research that feeds directly into Chinese weapons systems; and six quasi-private venture capital and private equity firms that invest in cutting-edge technologies. Civil-military fusion sets off alarm bells in Washington for several reasons.
Because Chinese dual-use R & D funding often falls outside the formal PLA budget, it can be hard to track and may be quite high. One recent study of the Chinese defense supply chain by the research firm C4ADS noted that at least six quasi-private investment vehicles partially or wholly own at least 232 companies involved in China’s defense-procurement network. And in the opaque Chinese system, it is virtually impossible to find a budget for civil-military fusion initiatives. (It is worth noting, however, that civil-military fusion may bring a degree of transparency to PLA procurement, since by broadcasting their desire to sell to the military, Chinese companies give Western analysts a sense of which technologies the PLA is targeting.)What is more, unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese companies don’t have the option of turning down government requests to share technology. And it is all too easy for Western companies and institutions to unwittingly contribute to the PLA’s advancement, given the bewildering array of contractors, subcontractors, academic institutions, and semiprivate investment vehicles involved in civil-military fusion.
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In one famous case, after 75 percent of the British company Dynex Semiconductor was acquired by a Chinese civilian locomotive company, an advanced technology developed by Dynex ended up in the aircraft launch systems on China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier. It is all too easy for Western companies and institutions to unwittingly contribute to the PLA’s advancement, given the bewildering array of contractors, subcontractors, academic institutions, and semiprivate investment vehicles involved in civil-military fusion. many of these were Maoist-era relics, largely cordoned off from the actual economy.
In 2010, only an estimated one percent of Chinese tech firms were involved in defense. The PLA is in “urgent need of improving its informatization (i.e. applying the digital revolution to the military The U. military has cooperated extensively and effectively with universities and private companies for decades.
In the 1930s, it founded national labs that proved critical in the field of supercomputing. It collaborated with Texas Instruments and Fairchild Semiconductor to develop microprocessors.
In 1958, it created the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which helped develop GPS and the Internet. Most recently, the Silicon Valley–based Defense Innovation Unit, founded in 2015, has helped innovative startups gain a foothold at the Pentagon. Some Chinese papers on civil-military fusion specifically argue for China to imitate these U. institutions, calling the Yet in its quest to catch up, China’s authoritarian system is prone to missteps and overreach.
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As it has with other Chinese initiatives (Belt and Road, Made in China 2025), the Communist Party encourages officials, university administrators, and private companies to parrot a slogan and show Beijing that they are doing something in service of it. Often, this means a significant amount of money is wasted, since provinces lavish subsidies on favored companies and technologies without first thinking through where or even if they are needed.several members of Congress have called for broad visa restrictions to prevent Chinese students from studying science and technology in the United States. The Trump administration recently revoked the visas of Chinese students and researchers affiliated with any “entity in the PRC that implements or supports the PRC’s ‘military-civil fusion strategy.’” Narrowly defined, this makes perfect sense. Commerce Department regulations, for example, restrict the export of any items that could conceivably be used by the militaries of China, Russia, or Venezuela. Rather than focusing on blocking Chinese advancement, the United States should push its own defense sector to be more agile and innovative—not by emulating civil-military fusion but by working with, rather than dictating to, actors outside of government. military can at best hope to be an early adopter, rather than an originator, of critical technologies. The Defense Department’s long lead times and slow decision-making remain significant obstacles to innovation. It is essential to strictly limit access to some research programs in order to protect national security. This potentially affects overly broad swaths of otherwise commercial technology, taking away key markets and thus making U. Such collaboration is especially crucial given the likelihood of significant and sustained pressure on the federal budget: partnering effectively with the private sector can save taxpayer dollars. Yet at a time of rapid technological development, even that will require a revolution in the U. A 2018 study found that the presence of new entrants to the defense industrial base had declined from 2007 through 2013 and then stagnated through 2016. Broadly interpreted, however, the visa move could affect thousands and thousands of Chinese students and researchers who have no relationship at all with the PLA. Washington has also—wisely—tightened both export controls and restrictions on Chinese investments in cutting-edge U. tech companies through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act. A more recent bipartisan assessment by the Reagan Institute noted that “beyond initial strides in narrow circumstances, the government has not shown a willingness to provide major contracts to nontraditional players.”Partnering with the private sector on collaborative disruption will require upfront investments and streamlined approaches for getting the best commercial technology into the Department of Defense. Encouraging a substantial brain drain from the United States to China or other markets seeking to attract the best and the brightest will only undermine U. If interpreted too broadly, however, these laws could also undermine U. There is broad bipartisan support for such approaches, and good ideas are already on the table; small experiments such the Defense Innovation Unit, the Defense Digital Service, and service-specific innovation efforts have shown success. Yet needed shifts in operational approach and investment in cutting-edge military capabilities remain far behind where they need to be given China’s technological push, even with the limitations of civil-military fusion.
To start, Washington must invest more in key emerging technologies. Direct federal investment is vital to progress in quantum computing, synthetic biology, semiconductors, and military-use artificial intelligence. Y.) bipartisan and bicameral Endless Frontier Act, which would vastly increase federal R & D funding for critical technologies, is a promising first step; some of its $110 billion in new funding should be directed to Pentagon innovation.